Shia Islam and Middle East Politics
US-Led Security Order and Transnational Shiism
May 18, 2025
Introduction
The current security order led by the United States and its allies in the Middle East has significantly influenced the politics and organizational structure of transnational Shiism. Stemming from the outcomes of both World Wars and subsequent interventions in the region, the existing security architecture, primarily allied with fundamentalist Sunni ideologies, has effectively changed the way the Shia organize, mobilize and perceive regional threats. Additionally, while subtle theological differences had existed in the past, the political strategies of the US have led to a more obvious sectarian divide that shapes the politics of many countries in the region. Middle Eastern nations increasingly rely on these theological and ideological differences to protect their interests in the region. This paper will attempt to highlight how these occurrences in recent history have inadvertently led to an overall and sometimes ambiguous ‘proxy’ war between two substantial powers in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran.
US political strategies and support for Sunni Supremacy
With the United States taking the reins from the declining British empire, they not only inherited policies that shaped many newly formed nations and monarchies but were additionally faced with difficulties in handling existing sectarian differences. The underlying issue with this deepening sectarian division was clearly “the manner in which they coercively created these states along new and quite deliberately sectarian lines in the name of safeguarding religious freedom” (Makdisi 32).
During the turn of the twentieth century, western powers, particularly Britian and France, knowingly forced harsher border lines where they were essentially indistinct in the past and as a result, ethnic, racial, and religious differences were brought to the surface, creating rifts which the US and other western players now inevitably play an important role in rectifying. One such division that persists today is the Sunni- Shia chasm, that was more or less under control in the past, now seems to shape the policies of major regional players.
In the case of the nation now named Saudi Arabia, the newly formed kingdom based their laws and official religion on the innovated and puritanical version of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism. Founded fairly recently in the 18th century, Wahhabism seeks to monopolize the religion and become the de facto representative of Muslims worldwide due to their ubiquitous title of ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’.
More importantly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia endorses extremist ideology which adheres to the concept of takfir or excommunication of any groups that do not fit into its definition of Islam and has become instrumental in quelling any uprisings of marginalized groups in the region. It is not uncommon for Wahhabi clergy in Saudi Arabia and its neighbors “to issue fatwas or give sermons denouncing Shia beliefs and practices as heresy” (Nasr 18).
Needless to say, Saudi Arabia has often aligned itself with Sunni factions, often in opposition to Shia groups that are widely perceived to receive support from Iran, the region’s sole Shia-majority state. The United States has found itself in a complex strategic position, simultaneously maintaining its alliance with Saudi Arabia while attempting to curb the broader destabilizing consequences of sectarian and group polarization.
The rise of extremist organizations such as ISIS, which advocate a radicalized interpretation of Sunni Islam, has further complicated the regional strategies of both the United States and Saudi Arabia. Paradoxically, due to the United States’ economic and political interests, these developments were tolerated and have become increasingly difficult to reconcile given the US’ apparent ‘war on terror’ that is born from the same countries they support.
Nonetheless, what both parties have found in this conundrum is a unifying factor in the form of a common enemy, the center of their perceived ‘axis of evil’: transnational Shiism represented by Iran.
Moreover, the recent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have significantly intensified sectarian tensions across the region. These current events have made it clear that “U.S. interests and objectives in the greater Middle East are ineluctably tied to the ebbs and flows of Shia-Sunni struggles for power. Policymaking must reflect this reality, both by responding to the threat posed by the broader Sunni reaction to Shia revival in Iraq and by exploiting the opportunities that the growing Shia power in the region presents” (Nasr 8).
From Quietism to the Shia Revival
Countering the Sunni supremacy in the region, the recent Shia Revival is a significant development in the Middle East and has had far reaching effects. However, it is imperative to note that Shiism was in an overwhelmingly quietist position since the early years of Islam due to the persecution by the majority establishments or Caliphates against the Imamate, which consisted of direct descendants of Prophet Muhammad.
Quietism in Shia Islam can be traced back to its early history, particularly after the tragic events of Karbala in 680 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and third Imam of third Shi’a, Husain, was martyred. This pivotal moment not only solidified the Shia identity but also instilled a sense of martyrdom and suffering that characterized Shia spirituality.
Since then, for centuries, the succeeding Imams and their followers decided to keep a safe distance from political activism, focusing instead on religious jurisprudence, spiritual guidance and perhaps most importantly, the preservation of religious practices related to Shia history.
The evolution of these practices resulted in them being used as a vehicle to express both past and present state of affairs and “given the huge emotional attachment of many religious Shia to these mourning processions, it was perhaps obvious that political dissent was articulated through these rituals and the legacy of political Shia Islam” (Matthiessen 102).
Significantly, in the physical absence of the twelfth Imam, “qualified Shi’i mujtahids have acted as his general deputies, and they remain responsible for leading the community until the promised day of the re-emergence of the infallible imam. This doctrine implies that it is incumbent upon Shi’i mujtahids to protect the community from threats during this period of transition…The question here is, when does a high-ranking Shi’i mujtahid become politically active and when does he remain quiet?” (Kalantari 2).
Based on recent history and contemporary Shia literature, it can be concluded that if the conceptual ‘Citadel of Islam’ and the perpetuity of the population of believers is at risk, then becoming politically active is incumbent upon both scholars and the general public.
The unanimous support of the Citadel of Islam concept “has been used to justify Shia political activism, especially to defend the principles of the faith, and to defend the community from the threat of outsiders” (Kalantari 223).
Consequently, the Shia community has increasingly embraced activism in response to various socio-political challenges from both world wars to the more recent US backed Sunni supremacy in the region.
This significant shift from quietism to activism within the Shia community began to gain momentum in the 20th century, influenced by various socio-political factors. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 marked a significant turning point, as it demonstrated the potential for Shia Islam to engage actively in political affairs. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, Shia clerics mobilized the masses, advocating for a government based on Islamic principles and the prevailing concept of wilayat e faqih or a government of the clerics.
This event not only inspired Shia communities around the world but also challenged the age-old notion of political quietism. More recently, the 2003 US invasion and war in Iraq inadvertently provided the opportunity for Iran and other transnational Shia populations to resume their centuries old relationship with the country as one of the most important places for visitation and center of learning in Shia Islam.
These developments and revival have created an interesting situation in which, “today, the active Shia leadership in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon seem to have coherent pragmatic policies that comply with the norms of the international community” (Kalantari 15). However, in order to maintain the status quo and its pervasive support for Sunni supremacy, “the United States cannot openly embrace the Shia revival without alienating many in the Arab world” (Nasr 20).
Terrorism vs Resistance
While the Shia Revival paved the way for global Shia Islam to assert its influence, it also increased underlying anti-Shia sentiment across the Sunni majority countries.
It is imperative to note that although Wahhabism is outside the circle of traditional Sunnism, it undoubtably falls under the overall Sunni umbrella and therefore gives legitimacy to any groups claiming similar ideology even if they are classified as terrorist organizations.
For example, some of the world’s most hostile terrorist organizations such as former Al Qaida, ISIS and other like-minded groups adhere to the excommunicatory ideology found in Wahhabism.
This poses a challenge for majority Sunni countries, and in turn their western partners, who publicly disavow the militancy and outright terrorism that has been cultivated within its ideology.
Likewise, it has become increasingly difficult to explain the US-Saudi alliance, particularly post 9/11, when “Sunni militancy is an ascendant, violent, ideological force that is not only anti-Shia but also very anti-American” (Nasr 19).
The growing influence of transnational Shiism and the simultaneous attacks on Shia populations by various terror groups make it clear that “Sunni militancy is designed both to combat the Shia revival and provoke a sectarian civil war” (Nasr 20).
This type of formidable militancy seeks to curb any transnational Shia influence and has found its way beyond the Middle East in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where there is a substantial Shia population.
Axis of Resistance and Current Events
According to the Saudi Arabian embassy, “The U.S. is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia is the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East.”
This combined with billions of dollars in weapons sales, the ever-present US military bases and the validation of normalizing ties with Israel have further cemented outright compliance and accepting western interference as the norm in regional affairs.
Due to the ongoing and unequivocal support for US backed Sunni hegemony in the region, and in opposition to the countries that belong to the US sphere of influence, the emergence of the informal alliance commonly called the “Axis of Resistance” was formed.
This alliance was foreseeable as “with the American invasion of Iraq, a much more direct threat emerged from the United States. The establishment of a permanent and hostile US presence on the border of both countries galvanized further strategic cooperation and coalition-building in order to ensure survival. The Axis of Resistance was thus born to fend off shared threats” (Ahmadian and Mohseni 349).
The advent of this resistance force is in direct response to the perceived arc of compliance to western influence represented by the majority Sunni Arab states.
However, the resistance force isn’t solely based on Shia adherents, as Hamas’ recent integration into the axis proves.
There is therefore a growing body of “divergent secular and religious, Shia and Sunni actors [who] converge around an anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist identity, which seeks to resist US, Israeli and Saudi Arabian machinations in the region, while reclaiming sovereignty over their lands and expelling foreign occupation” (Saad 635).
Interestingly, “while most attention over the past two decades has been devoted to Iran’s nuclear program, regional anxiety regarding Iran’s geopolitical ascendence stemmed from its growing conventional influence in the Middle East” (Sobelman 2024).
Iran-Hezbollah Case Study
One of the most noticeable relationships and an interesting case study in the axis of resistance is that of Iran-Hezbollah.
Contrary to the common misconception that “centuries’ old Shia religious networks in the Middle East are the recent outgrowths of geopolitical competition between regional powers” (Saad 628), this allyship has roots that go back centuries.
Cultural and religious links between both Persian and Levantine Shia communities enabled exchanges of scholarship, jurisprudence, and theology for hundreds of years that predate modern US-led alliances in the region.
Due to the volatile political climate in recent times, Hezbollah then emerged as a resistance movement in response to Israeli occupation and rapidly turned into a powerful military and political force.
Therefore, the formation of Hezbollah was an organic response to local aggression and the need to protect Shia communities from further sectarian marginalization.
Syria and Regional Shifts
The recent events in Syria also highlight the ever-changing dynamics in the region.
The ousting of Bashar Al Assad effectively removed Syria from the axis of resistance into the US sphere of influence, fortifying Sunni supremacy with the installation of a former Al Qaida terrorist.
These inconsistencies and contradictions on the parts of the US and its allies seem to strengthen the narrative of the resistance forces by reinforcing the notion that the current security order is not to be fully trusted and challenges the hypocrisy of western influence and double standards.
Conclusion and Future Directions
In the world of Shia politics in the middle east and beyond, the most active players are not only the ones that are currently alive, but martyrs have somehow asserted their influence though they are long gone.
The killings of former resistance players such as Qasim Soleimani, Nasrallah and others turned them into martyrs and heroes that are still remembered in the Shia world.
This often-underestimated power of global Shiism demonstrates the community’s resilience and adaptability in the face of crucial socio-political challenges.
As Shia Muslims continue to navigate the delicate balance between spiritual devotion and political engagement, their straddling between both quietism and activism serves as a powerful testament to their commitment to justice, equity, and the pursuit of a more inclusive society.
At the same time, if the Muslim world at large agrees to the resistance of US and western led interventions that benefit them and not the middle east region, then Shia-Sunni unity is an imperative that must be revisited.
Perhaps going back to religious ambiguity will assist in less division and strife among otherwise likeminded groups.
While not a monolith, there is the universal belief that the Muslim community is one ummah or community of believers and is a recurrent theme in the Quran itself where it states, “Indeed, the believers are but brothers. So, make settlement between your brothers” (Quran 49:10).
However, the responsibility for reconciliatory action and accountability lies on the majority’s shoulders since they control the perceived Islamic narrative to the outside world.
Although there has been some progress with the new and younger leadership in Saudi Arabia however, the marginalization and suppression of the Shia population remains a major issue.
Needless to say, it will prove difficult to unite when one party is determined on excommunicating the other out of the fold of Islam altogether.
Furthermore, the U.S. must navigate this complex landscape carefully, balancing its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states against the need to promote a more inclusive and tolerant interpretation of Islam that can mitigate sectarian tensions.
In conclusion, it is clear that the current state of global Shi’ism is deeply shaped by the U.S.-led security architecture and the installations of countries that belong to the US sphere of influence in the Middle East.
These perceptions of exclusion and marginalization have motivated Shia players across the world to adopt strategies that emphasize resistance, network-building, and ideological solidarity.
The incessant sanctions and maximum pressure campaigns are also not new to Islam , as the Prophet Muhammad was faced with severe boycotts that resulted in the suffering of early Muslims, and was then offered wealth and status, to which he famously replied, “Even if they placed the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left hand on condition that I abandon this course, I would not abandon it until God has made me victorious or I perish therein” (al Tabari 95).
Similarly, the Axis of Resistance perceives itself as both a response to and a critique of regional security dynamics, giving shape to new forms of political organization and regional influence.
As long as the security architecture remains unchanged and compliance is considered the norm in accepting US and western interference in the region, both Shia and Sunni actors are likely to continue evolving in opposition to it, continuously redefining the region’s political and sectarian landscape in the process.
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